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ight years have now passed since the start of the financial crisis. The subsequent Great 
Recession moved Central Banks to slash interest rates and employ unconventional 
monetary policy tools to ward off deflationary pressures. The ECB has maintained its 
main policy rate below 1% since July 2012, and since March 2014 it went below the zero for 
the rate on the deposit facility. In March 2015, the ECB started a large asset purchase 
programme (APP) as it felt that it could no longer lower rates. Are the APP and the 
extraordinarily low interest rate still appropriate, given the current average macro-economic 
environment in the euro area? 
The ECB’s mandate is price stability, which is defined as an inflation rate that is below but 
close to 2%. The benchmark indicator for inflation is the HICP (Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices). Over the past three years the headline inflation rate has gone up and down, with the 
oil price recently creeping up to nearly 2% (see Figure 1). But this has changed since the oil 
price has stabilised. Core inflation, which excludes changes in energy prices and unprocessed 
food, has been less volatile, at an average of 1.2% since 2008. The latest value for core 
inflation for May is 0.93%, slightly lower than the April high of 1.24%.1  
As argued in Alcidi et al. (2016), in economies labouring under a high debt burden consumer 
price indicators are not the best measure of how inflation or deflation affects the economy.  
We propose a return to the classic GDP deflator, which measures the difference between 
nominal and real GDP. This is a broader indicator that captures changes in prices related to 
production and changes in incomes as it is not affected by taxes or input (e.g. oil) price 
movements (for a more detailed explanation, see CEPS Special Report). The advantage of the 
GDP deflator is that it better measures the extent to which debtors might be burdened by 
                                                     
1 This stark increase may be partly attributed to the calendar effects of late Easter holidays. 
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falling prices. Of course, this does not mean that the ECB should change its benchmark 
inflation measure, but if sustainability of debt burden in real terms is the ECB’s main concern 
in a low inflation environment, HICP is not the right indicator to consider.   
While the headline inflation rate has been volatile due to shifts in energy prices, the core 
inflation and GDP deflator have moved closer together, with the GDP measure being more 
stable than core inflation, since even core inflation contains some raw material prices2 (see 
Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Contrasting various inflation measures for the eurozone 
 
Note: HICP inflation rates for 2017 based on the average inflation rate of the first five months of 2017. 
Sources: AMECO and Eurostat. 
One of the cornerstones of monetary policy calibration is the so-called Taylor rule, which 
describes the ‘optimal’ interest policy rate setting in terms of deviations of the inflation rate 
from the target rate, the output gap and the equilibrium real interest rate: 
𝑖𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑟∗ + 𝜋𝑡 + 0.5(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗) + 0.5?̅?𝑡
𝑖 
Where 𝑟∗denotes the long-term real equilibrium rate, 𝜋𝑡 is current inflation, 𝜋𝑡
∗ is the target 
and ?̅?𝑡
𝑖  is the output gap. 
A key problem with the application of the Taylor rule is that both the long-term real 
equilibrium rate and the output gap must be estimated.  We assume, in line with most of the 
literature, that the real interest rate was 2% before the crisis, but dropped to 1% once the 
recession hit. The output gap is estimated frequently by the European Commission, but these 
estimates tend to be revised, even radically, over time. During the boom years, up to 2008, 
the Commission’s estimates (along with those of most other analysts) put growth potential 
very high, thus producing low (but still positive) output gaps before the crisis. These figures 
were subsequently revised in light of the slow growth since 2009, which suggested a much 
lower potential. We thus present two estimates for the Taylor rule policy rate: one with the 
output gap as it was reported at the time when the policy decision was to be taken and 
another one with the output gap as it is reported today. 
                                                     
2 Eurostat, 2015. 
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With these assumptions, we find that for the ECB the Taylor rule would have prescribed a 
higher interest rate prior to the crisis and thereafter a much faster and deeper decline (see 
Figure 2). According to the Taylor rule, based on ex post data, 2015 would have been the 
point in time when the ECB should have started to raise the interest rate. In reality, this is 
when the ECB did the opposite by loosening further monetary conditions through its massive 
bond purchase programme.  
CEPII (2016) translates the impact of the bond purchases into an equivalent measure of policy 
easing, by estimating the so-called shadow interest rate; namely the policy rate without a 
zero bound that the ECB would have had to adopt to achieve the same monetary conditions 
as it did with the quantitative easing (QE) effects. They find that the shadow rate would have 
dropped below -3%. The ECB has thus followed the opposite direction of the trend suggested 
by the Taylor rule. 
For 2016, both ex ante and real-time data3 would have called for an increase of its interest 
rate. Using the output gap and the GDP deflator as provided by the European Commission 
forecasts for 2017, the rule’s predicted policy rate points to a further increase led by another 
narrowing of the output gap4 and a rise in the deflator. 
Figure 2. The Taylor rule for the eurozone 
 
Note: Inflation rate based on GDP deflator. The equilibrium rate for the pre-crisis period up to 2009 is set at 2% and 
thereafter at 1%, oriented along the potential growth rate over these periods. 
Sources: AMECO, ECB and Eurostat. 
It is difficult to compare the policy rate suggested by the Taylor rule to actual rates in the 
presence of unconventional policy measures that are currently in place. This result should be 
                                                     
3 Real-time data gives a more realistic assessment of past interest rate settings, as policymakers have to make 
decisions based on the data available at the time. 
4 The output gap is estimated to decrease to only slightly above balance (-0.6%) in 2017 and to close entirely in 
2018. 
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taken as an indication of a move towards the normalisation of monetary policy conditions, in 
response to signals of persistent improvement in macroeconomic conditions.    
Until now, the ECB has placed limited weight on signals from macroeconomic fundamentals, 
other than consumer inflation, and has argued that the observed macroeconomic 
improvements rely on policy support. This argument is steadily losing traction as the recovery 
in the euro solidifies and persists. The present combination of negative rates plus asset 
purchases is becoming increasingly difficult to justify. On present trends, even Mario Draghi’s 
strict four prerequisites5 for a change in monetary policy - all based exclusively on consumer 
price inflation - might soon be met. 
The time has come to prepare for an exit from unconventional policies that are no longer 
needed, given the absence of any signs of deflation. 
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5 The four prerequisites are: i) a persistent rise in inflation, ii) a rise in inflation expectations, iii) it applies to the 
eurozone average, not individual member states and iv) inflation should hold up without unconventional 
measures. 
